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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (1976).
Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976).
Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976).
Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. 3001 (1976).
The Supreme Court this past term decided five
cases involving various attempts by states to devise a
constitutional form of capital punishment. In Gregg
v. Georgia, 'Proffitt v. Florida, 2 and Jurek v. Texas, I
the Court held that the respective states had devised
statutes permitting capital punishment which could
pass constitutional muster. Yet state plans in two
other cases, Woodson v. North Carolina," and
Roberts v. Louisiana,' failed to meet the Court's
constitutional standards.
The Court heard all five cases in order to consider
issues left unresolved by its 1972 decision on capital
punishment, Furman v. Georgia. ' In Furman the
Court held that the Georgia death penalty statutes
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the eight and fourteenth amendments. How-
ever, because each Justice filed a separate opinion in
Furman, and because no one opinion was concurred
in by a majority, the exact requirements for a
constitutional death penalty remained unarticu-
lated. "The statutes in question in Furman gave total
196 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
296 S.Ct. 2960 (1976).
396 S.Ct. 2950 (1976).
'96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976).
596 S.Ct. 3001 (1976).
0408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7Justice Douglas found that the Georgia plan was
"pregnant with discrimination" and thereby incompatible
with the concept of equal protection implicit in the ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas,
J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded that the death
penalty has been too "wantonly and ... freakishly" ap-
plied to be permitted under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
White held that because of the infrequency with which the
penalty was imposed, the Georgia penalty failed to further
the social ends which capital punishment was meant to
serve. Therefore, when it was imposed it constituted the
pointless extinction of life resulting in the violation of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 312 (White, J.,
concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall in separate
opinions held that the death penalty was per se unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring), 359 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
discretion to the jury in deciding whether the death
penalty would be imposed. Although there was no
one opinion of the Court, the Justices of the majority
did focus somewhat on this uncontrolled jury discre-
tion and the possibility of arbitrary and capricious
imposition of the death penalty as one basis for their
opinions. Since all state statutes then in effect
contained similar allowances for jury discretion
along the lines of the Georgia plan, the practical
effect of Furman was to foreclose executions under all
state statutes. In addition the language of the decision
created some apprehension that the Court might, in
the next case before it, totally ban capital punish-
ment.
In the face of this uncertainty several states passed
new capital punishment laws and, as would be
expected, defendants sentenced under these new laws
immediately challenged their constitutionality. Each
of the five cases which the Court agreed to hear
raised two major issues: 1) Does the penalty of death
for the crime of murder constitute a per se violation
of the eighth and fourteenth amendments and, 2) if
not, does the particular death penalty statute in
question create a substantial risk that the death
penalty might be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, thus violating the eighth and
fourteenth amendments?
THE DEATH PENALTY AS A PER SE VIOLATION
Seven of the Justices reached the conclusion that
capital punishment does not constitute a per se
violation of the Constitution. 'The Court considered
each case separately, but the issue of the per se
constitutionality of the death penalty was treated
largely in Gregg v. Georgia' and Roberts v. Louisi-
'Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2932 (Stewart, Powell,
Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana 96 S.
Ct. at 3014 (White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ., Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
'Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2922 (Stewart, J.,
plurality).
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ana. "o There were two separate plurality opinions
on this issue.
In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart, joined by
Justices Powell and Stevens [hereinafter the Stewart
plurality] noted that the Court had never before
squarely faced the claim that the penalty of death
itself is a cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Constitution, regardless of the crime commit-
ted or the sentencing procedure used. On a number of
occasions "' the Court simply assumed the constitu-
tionality of capital punishment, that assumption pro-
viding a necessary foundation for its decisions. 12
An examination of prior cases revealed that the
Court has never viewed the eighth amendment as a
static concept: "The Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." "Thus in
order to determine the constitutionality of the death
penalty, the Stewart plurality felt the Court must
assess contemporary values regarding capital punish-
ment, looking to objective rather than subjective
indicia that would reflect public attitudes. Yet the
Stewart plurality recognized that public perceptions
of decency would not be conclusive since prior
decisions have also emphasized that the basic tenet
underlying the eighth amendment is that any penalty
must accord with the "dignity of man." ' Such a
standard prescribes that the penalty should not
involve "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" and that the "punishment not be grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime." "
The Stewart plurality concluded that capital pun-
ishment for murder did not violate that standard. '
"Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. at 3014 (White, J.,
dissenting).
"Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 464 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879).
296 S.Ct. at 2923. While Furman did raise the issue of
the per.se unconstitutionality of the death penalty, it did
not decide the issue. Four Justices in Furman would have
held that capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se.
408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C. J., dissenting), 405 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting), 414 (Powell, J., dissenting), 465
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Two Justices would have held
the death penalty unconstitutional. Id. at 257 (Brennan,
J., concurring), 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). The re-
maining three Justices left the question open. Id. at 240
(Douglas, J., concurring), 306 (Stewart, J., concurring),
310 (White, J., concurring).
3Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren,
C.J., plurality opinion).
"Id. at 100.
"Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2925.
16Id. at 2931-32. It is important to note that the Court
was only considering capital punishment for the crime of
Prior cases had rejected the argument that death
itself was cruel and unusual punishment. In an early
case dealing with death inflicted by electrocution the
Court said:
IT]he punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the. . . extinguishment of life. "
The same sentiment was expressed' much more
recently by Chief Justice Warren:
[Tihe death penalty has been employed throughout
our history, and in a day when it is still widely
accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty. 1
The Stewart plurality also noted that the standard
must be applied with an awareness of the judiciary's
limited role in assessing the constitutionality of a
punishment selected by a democratically elected
legislature. "Caution was urged by the plurality lest:
Under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Pinishmerilt
Clause, [the Court becomes] the ultimate arbiter of the
standards of criminal responsibility . . . throughout
the country. 2
The fact that since Furman thirty-five states "and
the federal government 2 2 have enacted new statutes
incorporating capital punishment convinced the
Stewart plurality that contemporary values had not
rejected the penalty. The plurality also relied upon
the facts that juries have convicted and sentenced 460
persons to death under these new statutes and that
state referenda both before and after Furman have
evidenced continued acceptance of the death penal-
ty. 23
The Stewart plurality found the penological jus-
tifications of retribution and deterrence were compat-
ible with the basic dignity of man concept said to be
the core of the eighth amendment. While retribution
was not viewed as a dominant objective of the
criminal law, the plurality found that neither was it a
murder and that it reserved judgement on the per se uncon-
stitutionality of the death penalty for crimes that did not
encompass the taking of human life.
"In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
"
5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (Warren,
C. J., plurality opinion).
"Gregg v.'Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2928 n.23 (StewartJ.,
plurality opinion).
2 Id. at 2927, quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514,
533 (1968).
2196 S.Ct. at 2928 n.23.




forbidden one. 2' Furthermore, even though many
might find the idea of retribution unappealing, the
Stewart plurality felt it was a concept of great
importance to the general public, and expressed the
view that anarchy would develop if the public sensed
that society was unwilling to impose the punishment
criminals "deserve." 25
Concerning the deterrent effect of the death penal-
ty, the Stewart plurality noted that the debate has
gone on long, but inconclusively. 26 This inconclu-
siveness did, not invalidate deterrence as a justifica-
tion of the death penalty, rather it shifted the final
determination of that complex issue back to the legis-
latures which, according to the Stewart plurality, are
better equipped to evaluate this question,.
The views of the other four Justices who cast their
votes to deny the per se unconstitutionality- of capital
ptinihment did not come in the principle case,
Gregg, but rather in Roberts v. Louisiana2" in the
dissenting opinion of Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun,, Rehnquist, and the Chief Justice
[hereinafter the White plurality]. The White plural-
ity closely parallels much of the reasoning of the
Stewart plurality. It focuses on the longstanding
acceptance of capital punishment and the legitimate
nature of that penalty as an instrument of retribution
and deterrence. According to the White plurality,
acceptance of the concept of capital punishment by
the Framers of the Constitution is clearly shown by
the wording of the fifth amendment:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment.or
indictment of a Grand Jury,. . . [and no person shall
be] twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . nor be
deprived of life without due process of law. 29
The fourteenth amendment enacted nearly a century
later likewise prevents the states from depriving any
peson of "life" without due process of law.
19
Furthermore, not only has the death penalty been
part of the criminal justice system of a majority of
"Id. at 2930.
25Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2930 (Stewart, J.,
plurality).26/d.
2796 S.Ct. at 3008 (White, J., dissenting). These Jus-
tices dissented because they felt that the death penalty
statute was constitutional in Roberts even though it was
mandatory. They took the occasion of a dissent to express
their views on the per se constitutionality of capital punish-
ment.
2U.S. GONsT. amend. V.
2996 S.Ct. at 3014-15 (White, J., dissenting). See
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
'states ever 'since the Union was' formed, but the
plethora of post-Furman capital punishment statutes
indicates that the death penalty is still acceptable toa
majority of the people of the country. 30 Its "wide-
spread re-enactment . . . answers any claims that
life imprisonment is adequate punishment to satisfy
the need for reprobation or retribution." 2
Concerning the death penalty as a deterrent factor,
the White plurality, like the Stewart plurality,
acknowledges that no clear evidence of deterrence can
be shown. The White plurality refused to reject the
legislative judgment that the imposition of capital
punishment will save innocent lives:
This concern for life and human values and the sincere
efforts of the States to pursue them are matters of the
greatest moment with which the judiciary should be
most reluctant to interfere.52
The Justices are not free to treat the issue before
them as if they were legislators voting for or against
capital punishment. Rather they must confine their
inquiry to the question of whether the eighth
amendment requires the Court to interfere with the
enforcement of these statutes. "
In summary, the seven Justices who voted to
deny the per se unconstitutionality of capital punish-
ment agreed that contemporary standards have not
rejected the death penalty. The Stewart plurality
further, concluded that apart from the views
expressed by society, the death penalty was not out of
proportion to the severity of the crime nor did it
constitute the unnecessary infliction of pain.
The views of the two dissenters sharply conflicted
with the views of the two pluralities. Justices
Brennan and Marshall each wrote dissenting opin-
ions in Gregg,"' in which both adhered to their
positions expressed in Furman that capital punish-
ment is unconstitutional per se, Justice Brennan
agreed with the Stewart plurality analysis that the
eighth amendment must draw its meaning,"from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society,""' but he disputed the conclu-
sion that those standards permit the imposition of the
death penalty today. Justice Brennan was not con-
"I1d. at 3016.311d. at 3016 (White,J, dissenting).321d. at 3017.
331d.
3 4d. at 2971 (Brennan,J., dissenting), 2973 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
"
5Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101 (Warren, C. J.,
plurality opinion).
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cerned with the method by which the penalty might
be imposed. He focused entirely on the essence of
the death penalty itself. For him whether a state
may impose capital punishment is essentially a moral
question:
From the beginning of our Nation, the punishment of
death has stirred acute public controversy.... At
bottom, the battle has been waged on moral grounds.
The country has debated whether a society for which
the dignity of the individual is the supreme value can,
without a fundamental inconsistency, follow the prac-
tice of deliberately putting some of its members to
death. In the United States, as in other nations of the
western world, "the struggle about this punishment
has been one between ancient and deeply rooted beliefs
in retribution, atonement, or vengence on the one
hand, and on the other, beliefs in the personal value
and dignity of the common man that were born of the
democratic movement of the eighteenth century . . . It
is this essentially moral conflict that forms the back-
drop for the past changes in and the present operation
of our system of imposing death as a punishment for
crime. "
According to Justice Brennan the eighth amendment
"embodies in unique degree moral principles
restraining the punishments that our civilized soci-
ety may impose on those persons who transgress its
laws." " It forces the state, even as it punishes, to
treat its citizens in a manner "consistent with their
intrinsic worth as human beings-a punishment
must not be so severe as to be degrading to human
dignity." "8Justice Brennan argued that if the rack,
the screw, and the wheel are degrading to human
dignity as punishments and therefore cruel and un-
usual punishments, then the extinguishment of a hu-
man life on the authority of the State surely can be no
longer morally tolerable in our civilized society. "
The fatal constitutional flaw of the death penalty, in
Justice Brennan's opinion, is that:
[Ilt treats members of the human race as nonhumans,
as objects to be toyed with and discarded. [It is] thus
inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the
Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human
being possessed of common human dignity. 40
Similarly, Justice Marshall's dissent in Gregg
reaffirmed his previous conviction that the death
3 Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2971, quoting Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 296.
"
7 Id. at 2972.38id.
391d.
4"Id., quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 273
(Brennan, J., concurring).
penalty is per se unconstitutional. He took notice of
the pluralities' attack on his Furman conclusion that
current moral values find capital punishment unac-
ceptable:
I would be less than candid if I did not acknowledge
that these developments "have a significant bearing on
a realistic assessment of the moral acceptability of the
death penalty to the American people."
Yet Justice Marshall refused to accept the notion that
an "informed citizenry" would find the death penal-
ty acceptable. He cites a post-Furman study "' pur-
porting to show that the American people know little
about capital punishnent and that the opinion of an
informed public would be significantly different from
that of an unaware public. But even if the post-Fur-
man statutes did reflect the views of an "informed
citizenry," Justice Marshall still contended that the
death penalty was excessive and for that reason alone
unconstitutional. 44
He took issue with the position of both pluralities
that retribution can serve as moral justification for
the death penalty. This idea was "the most disurbing
aspect" of the pluralities' opinions as far as Justice
Marshall was concerned. "He found it incredible to
suggest that the sanction of death is necessary to
prevent Americans from taking the law into their
own hands. "'The fact that the community demands
the life of the criminal because he "deserves it"
cannot be tolerable, concludes Justice Marshall,
because "such a penalty has as its very basis the total
denial of the wrong-doer's dignity and worth." 41
On the deterrent effect of capital punishment as a
justification for that penalty, Justice Marshall noted
that after a thorough review of the available data, he
had concluded in Furman that no positive correlation
between the two existed. Since that decision a study
by Isaac Ehrlich4' supported the contention that the
death penalty does deter murder. However, Justice
Marshall was convinced that the study was of little
4'The developments Justice Marshall was referring to
are the re-enactment of capital punishment statutes by
thirty-five states and Congress.
4296 S.Ct. at 2973 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
41Sarat & Vidmar, The Death Penalty and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis.
L. Rev. 171.




4'Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish-




assistance in assessing the deterrent impact because
of the questionable methodology used in the study. "
Justice Marshall remained convinced that the death
penalty does not deter crime. "
INFLICTION IN AN ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS
MANNER
Since a majority of the Justices felt that the
imposition of the death penalty was not per se
unconstitutional it was necessary to examine each
state's statutory scheme for sentencing. In Furman,
as noted earlier, the Court had placed some emphasis
on the requirement that the penalty may not be
imposed arbitrarily or capriciously. Each statute in
the five cases before the Court represented an attempt
by the states to comply with this loosely defined
directive of Furman.
In the lead case of Gregg v. Georgia, " the Court
examined Georgia's new statutes and found by a 7-2
margin, 52 that the Georgia legislature had success-
fully met the requirements of Furman. The Georgia
sentencing statutes permit the death penalty for five
crimes in addition to murder, as but the sentence
attacked by petitioner was for murder alone. 84 The
statutes call for a bifurcated trial. The first stage is
devoted to making a determination of guilt. The
second stage is to determine the sentence if the
defendant is found guilty. At the sentencing stage,
considerable latitude is given both the prosecutor and
the defense in introducing evidence that might have a
bearing on the sentencing authority's final judgment.
The death penalty may only be imposed at the
sentencing stage if the jury (or judge, if a bench trial)
4996 S.Ct. at 2975 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
501d.
5196 S.Ct. 2909 (1976).
5 Justices Stewart, Powell, Stevens, White, Rehnquist,
Blackmun, and the Chief'Justice voted to uphold the statute.
Justices Brennan and Marshall voted against the statute.
"The Georgia statutes, as amended after Furman,
retained capital punishment for murder, kidnapping for
ransom or where the victim is harmed, armed robbery,
rape, treason, and aircraft hijacking. GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902, 26-2001, 26-2201, 26-
3301(1972).
"The petitioner was convicted of armed robbery and
murder in the slaying of two men who had picked up
Gregg and a companion as they were hitchhiking. Gregg
was sentenced to death for both the murder conviction and
the armed robbery conviction but the Georgia Supreme
Court vacated the sentence for armed robbery as excessive
after comparing the sentence to similar cases of armed
,robbery. Just as the Court reserved judgement on the per
se constitutionality of capital punishment for crimes other
than murder, here the Court reserved judgement on the
constitutionality of statutory death sentences for convictions
of crimes other than murder.
finds at least one of the statutory aggravating
circumstances " and then elects to impose that sen-
tence. Even if one of the aggravating circumstances
"The aggravating circumstances are set out in GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (1975):
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the of-
fenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case.
(b) In all other offenses for which the death penalty
may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he
shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of
the following statutory aggravating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or
kidnapping was committed by a person with a
prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the
offense of murder was committed by a person who
has a substantial history of serious assaultive
criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or
kidnapping was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of another capital
felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of mur-
der was committed while the offender was engaged
in the commission of burglary or arson in the first
degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed rob-
bery, or kidnapping knowingly created a great risk
of death to more than one person in a public place
by means of a weapon or devise which would nor-
mally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder
for himself or another, for the purpose of receiving
money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of ajudicial official, formerjudicial
official, district attorney or solicitor or former dis-
trict attorney or solicitor during or because of the
exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to com-
mit murder or committed murder as an agent or
employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery or
kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, de-
pravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against
any peace officer, corrections employee or fireman
while engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a per-
son in, or who has escaped from, the lawful cus-
tody of a peace officer or place of lawful confine-
ment.
t10) The murder was committed for the purpose of
avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful
arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement,
of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the
trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be
given in charge and in writing to the jury for its de-
19761
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
is found, mitigating circumstances brought out dur-
ing the sentencing stage may influence the sentenc-
ing authority not to impose the death penalty. As an
additional safeguard against caprice, the Georgia
Supreme Court, under an automatic appeal proce-
dure built into the statute for all death sentences, "is
required to determine whether the sentence was
imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice,
whether the evidence supports the finding of an
aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence
is disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar
cases.
Petitioner Gregg attacked this statutory plan as
violative of the Furman requirements. He first
attacked the opportunities for discretionary action
under the statute, pointing in particular to the
unfettered authority of the prosecutor to determine
which defendants will be charged with a capital
crime and which will not; the discretion of the jury
to find the defendant guilty of a lesser included
offense; and the discretion of the Governor and the
Board of Pardons and Paroles to commute a death
sentence. The Stewart plurality noted that these
charges were little more than "a veiled contention
that Furman indirectly outlawed capital punishment
by placing totally unrealistic conditions on its use." "
According to the Stewart plurality, Furman held
only that in order to avert the capricious and
arbitrary use of the death penalty the decision of
when and how to use it had to be guided by standards
focusing attention on the particular offense and
offender. " Thus the existence of the various discre-
tionary stages inherent in the criminal justice system
was not a relevant factor concerning the issues raised
before the Court.
Petitioner next charged that the statutes were so
vague and broad that they left the juries "free to act
as arbitrarily and capriciously" as before in deter-
mining a sentence. " The Stewart plurality disa-
liberation. The jury, if its verdict be a recommenda-
tion of death, shall designate in writing, signed by
the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance
or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable
doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such
designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hi-
jacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravat-
ing circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1
(b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be im-
posed.
"GA. CODE ANN. § 2 7-2537(c) (Supp. 1975).
'796 S.Ct. at 2937 n.50.
5 Id. at 2937.
"Especially attacked were §§ 27-2534.1(b)(1), (3)
and (7).
greed. It pointed to the restricting interpretations
given the statutes by the Georgia Supreme Court8 0
and expressed confidence that the Georgia Supreme
Court would not adopt open-ended construction of
the statutes in the future. 6
The third flaw the petitioner presented was that
the statutes fell short of the requirements of Furman
because the juries could refuse to impose the death
penalty even if one or more of the aggravating factors
were found. The Stewart plurality declared that this
attack misinterprets Furman:
Since the proportionality requirement on review is
intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the
penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford mercy
does not render unconstitutional death sentences
imposed on defendants who were sentenced under a
system that does not create a substantial risk of
arbitrariness or caprice. "
Finally, the petitioner objected to the wide scope of
evidence and argument that is allowed at the sentenc-
ing state of the trial. The plurality quickly disposed
of this argument by saying that the more argument
and evidence presented, the better the opportunity
for the jury to assess whether to impose the death
penalty. "
In conclusion, the Stewart plurality stated that the
basic concern of Furman "centered on those defend-
ants who were being condemned to death capricious-
ly and arbitrarily.""64 Under the present Georgia
plan, the Stewart plurality concluded, a jury could
no longer do what it was possible to do under the old
Georgia plan; that is, it cannot impose the death
penalty "wantonly and freakishly; it is always
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines." "Juries
are now directed to focus their attention on the
nature and circumstances of the wrongdoer. This,
along with the review function of the Georgia
Supreme Court, assured the Stewart plurality that
the concerns that prompted the decision in Furman
would not be present under the new state plan.
Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist, wrote a concurrence 6 that dealt
with the question of prosecutorial discretion. Justice
White refused to accept the proposition that prosecu-
tors would use their discretion capriciously or unfair-
60Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976);
Jarrell v. State, 234 Ga. 410, 216 S.E.2d 258 (1975).
"196 S.Ct. at 2938-39.







ly to prosecute some defendants on stiffer charges
than other defendants. Prosecutors are only moti-
vated by "the strength of the case and the likelihood
that the jury would impose the death penalty if it
convicts," "'according to Justice White. The abuse of
discretion may be "an indictment of our entire
system of justice... . [But it] cannot be accepted as
a proposition of constitutional law." 68
Justice White's concurring opinion also dealt with
the issue of jury discretion. He rejected the conten-
tion that because the jury was the sentencing author-
ity, and because thejury is nqt required to impose the
death penalty no matter what circumstances are
found, the death penalty will still be imposed in a
discretionary and standardless fashion. Justice White
concluded that since the Georgia statutes narrowed
the scope of murder for which the death penalty can
be imposed by requiring a -finding of statutory
aggravating circumstances, juries will impose the
death sentence in a substantial portion of the cases so
defined. "In such circumstances it could no longer be
argued that the penalty of death is being imposed
wantonly or freakishly. 70
The statute 7 ' under scrutiny in Proffitt v. Flor-
ida,7 2 parallels the Georgia statutes in that the Flor-
ida statute provides that both aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances must be taken into account.
Like Georgia's statutes, the Florida statute enumer-
ates the aggravating circumstances. "' It also provides
1
71d. at 2949 (White, J., concurring).
68 d.
6 Id. at 2948.
70Justice Blackmun also voted in favor of the Georgia
statutes. Id. at 2971 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He merely
concurred in the judgment, citing his dissenting opinion in
Furman. Justice Blackmun followed the same procedure in
concurring with the Stewart plurality in Proffitt v. Florida,
and Jurek v. Texas. His dissent in Woodson v. North
Carolina likewise just referred to his Furman opinion. His
primary view in Furman expressed apprehension that the
states would reenact regressive capital punishment statutes,
eliminating the element of mercy in the imposition of the
penalty.75
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1976-77).
7296 S.Ct. 2960 (1976).
7"Aggravating circumstances are found in FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141 (5):
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person
under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of an-
other capital felony or of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the
defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, any robbery,
for automatic review of the sentence by the state
supreme court, 7, although there is no form pre-
scribed for that review. The Florida statute specifi-
cally enumerates some mitigating circumstances for
the jury to consider, 7 but the jury is not confined to
those circumstances and may take others into consid-
eration. The finding of the jury on sentencing is
merely advisory in Florida, as the trial judge makes
the final determination of the sentence. The same
7-2 majority upheld the Florida statute. 76
After rejecting the petitioner's attack on the statute
for allowing inherent discretion throughout the
system for the same reasons as it rejected that attack
in Gregg, the Stewart plurality considered the
argument that the statute was overbroad and vague
allowing "virtually any first degree murder convict
[to be] a candidate for the death sentence." "'Justice
Stewart's opinion considered the statute's provisions
as they have been construed by the Florida Supreme
Court 8 and concluded that the statute's provisions
were neither impermissibly vague nor of "inadequate
rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy
or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose
of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting
an escape from custody.
(0 The capital felony was committed for pecuniary
gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or
hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental func-
tion or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel.7 4
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (4).
"'Mitigating circumstances are found in FLA. STAT.
ANN.§ 921.141 (6):
(a) The defendant has no significant history of,
prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's
conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital
felony committed by another person and his participa-
tion was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or
under the substantial domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
7"See note 52 supra.
7796 S.Ct. at 2968.
"Halliwell v. State, 323 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1975); Tedder
v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975); Alford v. State, 307
So.2d 433 (Fla. 1975).
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guidance to those charged with the duty of recom-
mending or imposing sentences." 7
The petitioner next charged that the statute gave
no guidance to the judge or jury as to how to weigh
the various mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances. Once again the plurality opinion of Justice
Stewart rejected the argument, contending that:
The directions given to judge and jury are sufficiently
clear and precise to enable the various aggravating
circumstances to be weighed against the mitigating
ones. 80
The Stewart plurality found that while the decision
of whether to impose the death penalty may be hard,
it is basically the same type of decision that fact
finders are routinely required to make. Furman's
requirements are satisfied when the judge or jury
responsibile for sentencing is guided and channeled
by special factors that argue for or against the death
penalty, thus "eliminating total arbitrariness and
discretion in its imposition." 8"
The Florida statute does not provide a structured
form of review by the state supreme court, thus
opening up the process to the petitioner's charge that
it is necessarily subjective and unpredictable.
However, the Stewart plurality refused to find that
the process was necessarily ineffective or arbitrary.
On the contrary, they noted that the Florida
Supreme Court had undertaken its functions responsi-
bly. 
8 2
The brief concurring opinion written by Justice
White and joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that as to the categories of
murder where the death penalty could be imposed,
there was every reason to believe that the penalty will
be imposed with regularity. A potential killer, aware
that the penalty would likely be carried out, would be
thus deterred. Therefore, it could no longer be said
that the death penalty:
has ceased to be a credible deterrent or measurably to
contribute to any other end of punishment in the
criminal justce system. 8'







"See note 52 supra.
"96 S.Ct. 2950 (1976).
statute 86 does not include statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances as do the Florida and Georgia statutes.
However, the Stewart plurality held that the care-
fully limited scope of murder for which capital pun-
ishment can be imposed serves the same purpose as
statutory aggravating circumstances, that is, to guide
and channel the jury while eliminating arbitrary
discretion in the determination of the sentence. 87
This alone would not validate the Texas plan
because Furman mandates that mitigating circum-
stances must also be taken into account. "'Since the
statute does not specifically deal with mitigating
circumstances, the Stewart plurality carefully exam-
ined the three post-conviction questions8 9 which
under the statute the jury must answer affirmatively
8 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
8'96 S.Ct. at 2955. Murder is now defined in Texas
by TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (a) (Vernon 1974):
A person commits an offense if he:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an
individual;
(2) intends to cause serious body injury and commits
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the
death of an individual; or
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other
than voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, and in
the course of and in furtherance of the commission or
attempt, he commits or attempts to cimmit an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death
of an individual
Texas law defines as a capital offense the commission
of murder as defined in § 19.02 (a) (1) if:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who
is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty
and who the person knows was a peace officer or fire-
man;
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in
the course of committing or attempting to commit kid-
napping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape or ar-
son;
(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration or employs another to
commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or
attempting to escape from a penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institu-
tion, murders another who is employed in the opera-
tion of the penal institution.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN., tit. 5, § 19.03 (a) (Vernon 1974).
"'96 S.Ct. at 2956.
8 The questions the jury must answer are these:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately
and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society; and
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before the death sentence can be imposed.
The Stewart plurality found that the Texas Crimi-
nal Court of Appeals had indicated in its decision of
the petitioner's case that it would interpret the
second question so as to allow a defendant to bring to
the jury's attention whatever mitigating circum-
stances he may be able to show. 0 Thus, accepting
the Texas court's interpretation of the second ques-
tion, the Stewart plurality concluded that the Texas
statute is consistent with the requirements of Fur-
man. It provides for rational, even, and consistent
imposition of the death penalty and is therefore
constitutional. 91 
, Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist, filed a concurring opinion " once
iore making the point that the discretion inherent in
the criminal justice system during the course of any
prosecution does not mean that the penalty of death
would be "arbitrarily and freakishly" imposed. 9'
i -In Woodson v. North Carolina, "a 5-4 majority"9
held that the state plan "failed to provide a constitu-
tionally tolerable response to Furman. The North
Carolina plan called for mandatory death if convicted
of first degree murder as that was defined in the
statute. With the Stewart plurality again writing the
main opinion, the history of mandatory death penal-
ties was examined. It was the plurality's impression
that such penalties have been rejected as "unduly
harsh and unworkably rigid." 0 7 One factor was the
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasona.
ble in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
TExAs CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., Art.' 37.01 (b) (Vernon
Supp. 1975-76).
"State v. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d 934, 939-40 (1975).
"i 9 6 S.Ct. at 2958.
"Id. at 2959 (White, J., concurring). The Chief Justice
concurred separately in the judgment without opinion.
"Id. at 2959-60.
"96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976).
"Concurring in the opinion were: Stewart, Powell,
Stevens, JJ., id. at 2981; Brennan, J., id. at 2992; Mar-
shall, J., id. Dissenting were: Burger, C.J., White,
Rehnquist, JJ., id. Blackmun, J., id. at 2993.
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of
poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture,
or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing, or which shall be committed in the
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony shall be
deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall be
punished with death.
'796 S.Ct. at 2986 (Stewart, J., plurality).
behavior of juries confronted with mandatory penal-
ties. Many juries, finding the death penalty too
severe in a significant number of cases, refused to
return guilty' verdicts, since such verdicts would
automatically have sentenced the defendants to
death. In response to this reluctance to return guilty
verdicts, legislatures began to enact laws which
would allow juries to distinguish between murderers,
to exercise discretion, and to take mitigating cir-
cumstances into account in sentencing for capital
cases. By the'time the Court decided Furman in
1972, mandatory sentences were widely disfavored
by both legislatures and juries, which the plurality
concluded was evidence that evolving standards of
decency had come to reject such penalties as violating
societal standards. 98
In light of this widespread rejection of mandatory
death sentences, the Stewart plurality reasoned that
the states enacting mandatory penalties after Furman
must have done so in an attempt to respond to the
confusion generated by the Furman opinion, and not
because of any renewed social acceptance of manda-
tory death sentences. " The severity of the only
penalty available upon a finding of guilty will
encourage juries to violate their oaths to return a
verdict supported by the evidence. Mandatory death
penalties continue to be inconsistent with contempo-
rary standards respecting the imposition of death and
therefore, according to the Stewart plurality, the
eighth amendment-prohibits their use. 100
Finally, the Stewart plurality held the North
Carolina plan invalid for failing to allow mitigating
circumstances to be'considered before the sentence of
death is imposed. Befause of the qualitative differ-
ence between the death penalty and prison sentences,
the Stewart plurality concluded that the fundamental
respect for human dignity underlying the eighth
amendment requires factors relating to the defendant
to be taken into account during sentencing. "'1 With-
out the opportunity to present relevant facts to the
sentencing authority, the sentencing procedure:
treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not
as uniquely individual human beings, but as members
of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to
the blind infliction of the penalty of death. 102
Therefore, concluded the Stewart plurality, the
"'Id. at 2988.
"'Id. at 2988-89.00Id. at 2990.




North Carolina statutory plan failed totally to meet
the requirements set out in Furman.
Justices Brennan and Marshall found the statute
invalid, but did so on the basis of their belief that
capital punishment is per se unconstitutional. o'
Four Justices dissented, but the major dissenting
opinion was filed by Justice Rehnquist. 'l In a long
opinion, Justice Rehnquist, adhering to his opinion
in Furman, rejected every argument of the Stewart
plurality. 108
He first questioned whether these cases raised
an eighth amendment issue at all. In his view the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
was limited to those punishments deemed cruel and
unusual at the time of the adoption of the amend-
ment. 106
Justice Rehnquist took issue with the assertion of
the Stewart plurality that the history of mandatory
death penalties revealed that those penalties had been
rejected as "unduly harsh and unworkably rigid." "'
In essence he argued that the legislative decisions to
move away from mandatory death penalties in no
way reflected a rejection of that form of punishment.
Rather, the legislatures reasoned that if a jury could
return a sentence other than death upon a conviction
for murder, fewer guilty criminals would go com-
pletely free. Justice Rehnquist attributed the problem
of juries acquitting obviously guilty defendants to a
small minority of jurors who could defeat the
majority by casting a single vote to acquit. Thus, the
problem was due to the requirement of unanimity of
verdicts and not to societal rejection of mandatory
death penalties. 108 Justice Rehnquist could see no
constitutional difference between the type of discre-
tion approved in the Georgia, Florida and Texas
statutes and the type of discretion disapproved in the
North Carolina statute. He stated that the proper
inquiry of the Court, once the determination was
made that capital punishment was not per se uncon-
stitutional, should be limited to whether the defend-
ant received a. fair trial.
The same 5-4 majority that struck down the
North Carolina plan also struck down the Louisiana
plan for mandatory death sentences in Roberts v.
.
31d. (Brennan, J., concurring), 2992 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
1
0 41d. at 2993 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justices
White, Blackmun, and the Chief Justice were the other
dissenters. Id. at 2978, 2992.
105408 U.S. 238, 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
10896 S.Ct. at 2993.
'1Id. at 2994.
'"Id, at 2996.
Louisiana. '09 Although the Louisiana statute "
limits those cases where capital punishment is pos-
sible and employed a responsive verdict system,
those limitations were held insufficient to overcom.n.
the constitutional infirmities of mandatory death
sentences. "' The problem with the mandatory,
approach is that society has rejected the belief that
"every offense in a like legal category calls for identi-
cal punishment without regard to the past life and
habits of a particular offender." 11"
The plan was also found insufficient by the
Stewart plurality in failing to provide standards for
the jury to follow in sentencing. The responsive
verdict system employed in the statute allows the jury
to pick from a-number of alternative verdicts given to
it ranging from not guilty, to manslaughter, to
second degree murder, to first degree murder. The
Stewart plurality concluded that there were no
guidelines for the jury to follow and that the plan
invited the jurors to disregard their oaths and choose
a verdict for a, lesser offense whenever they felt the
penalty of death was inappropriate. "'
Justice White's dissent, 11, joined by the Chief
Justice, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist,
charged that the mere possibility that the jury might
violate its oath and refuse to convict for first degree
murder is not sufficient to equate the Louisiana plan
with the unlimited discretion found unconstitutional
in Furman. Juries should be trusted to do what they
are supposed to do, otherwise no jury system could be
found constitutional. The same is true regarding the
discretion exercised by prosecutors in performing
their wide ranging duties, Justice White asserted.
The exercise of discretion by, the jury and the
prosecutor in the course of their duties is nothing
more than the "rational enforcement of the State's
criminal law . . . system." 115
The dissenters also disagreed with the Stewart
plurality's holding that a separate proceeding must
be held at which the sentencing authority must take
into consideration the character and record of the
defendant. Justice White could find no reason why a
state could not decide that the commission of certain
crimes conclusively established the character of the
defendant. In addition, he felt that a state should be
0996 S.Ct. 3001 (1976).
".LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974).
"'96 S.Ct. at 3006.
I Id., quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247 (1949).
"'Id. at 3007.
1'4Id. at 3008 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
... d. at 3013.
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able to conclude that the need to deter certain crimes
and the likelihood that the death penalty will succeed
in deterring them is such that the penalty should be
mandatory for all who commit those crimes. "'
Justice White was concerned that the Stewart
plurality was taking a position in Roberts and
Woodson which disregarded past Court decisions.
He pointed in particular to the case of McGautha v.
California, "'in which the Court held that permitting
a jury to impose the death sentence without govern-
ing standards was constitutionally permissible. Jus-
tice White, finding no' reason to reconsider the
holding of McGautha,. stated that he "would not
invalidate the Louisiana statute for its failure to
provide what McGautha held it need not pro-
vide." 18 Finally, the dissenters took issue with the
plurality's conclusion that the history of mandatory
death penalties revealed society's rejection of them.
While state legislatures may have preferred discre-
tionary sentencing to mandatory penalties, this did
not suggest to Justice White the total rejection of
mandatory plans. It simply meant that the state
legislatures had indicated a preference from two
alternatives, neither type of sentencing being wholly
rejected in the sense that the Stewart plurality
implied.
CONCLUSION
As the numerous opinions filed in these cases
indicate, the Court still does not speak with one voice
on the issues raised by capital punishment. However,
in contrast to Furman, in which the Court was so
badly fragmented that no one could be quite sure of
what decision was actually handed down, the Court
in these cases not only answers the basic question of
the constitutionality of the death penalty, but also
gives considerable guidance to states which wish to
employ capital punishment as part of their criminal
justice system. Since the Stewart plurality is the
narrowest position a majority of the Court adheres
to, if a state legislature follows their guidelines it will
in all probability have achieved- a constitutional
capital punishment statute. 1 9By including statutory
aggravating circumstances, it will ensure that the
sentencing authority articulate exactly why a given
defendant is to be put to death for his crime. The
6 Id. at 3018.
117402 U.S. 183 (1971).
"Roberts v. Louisiana, 96 S.Ct. at 3008 (White, J.,
dissenting).
""Enactment of a statute like the Texas statute would
require state courts to interpret the statute in a similar
fashion as the Texas courts did.
requirement of consideration of mitigating circum-
stances by the sentencing authority will focus the
attention of the judge or jury on the individual
offense and on the offender, who will be given an
opportunity to persuade the sentencing authority
that death is not an appropriate penalty. While this
does leave some discretion with the sentencing
authority, it is at least guided and channeled so that
an evenhanded administration of capital punishment
is clearly more possible than under a system which
provides no such guidance. Given the fundamental
proposition that capital punishment is not per se
cruel and unusual, the safeguards set forth in these
cases may provide as much protection against arbi-
trariness and capriciousness as is possible.
Because of the multi-opinioned Furman decision,
it is difficult to state categorically that Gregg and its
companion cases represent a total departure from
that case, but the tone of these cases is significantly
different from Furman. Undertones in Furman sug-
gested that factors of racial and economic prejudices
permeated the state capital punishment plans. "'
There was also a definite moral tone to the opinions,
ranging from Justice Brennan's and Justice Mar-
shall's conclusion that capital punishment is immo-
ral 2 1 to Justice White's more cautious assertion that
if the death penalty could not be shown to be a
deterrent force, it should be held unconstiutional as
the "needless extinction of life." "'2 Gregg and its
companion cases are concerned more with the proce-
dures set forth in the statutes than with the racial or
class characteristics of those against whom they are
being applied.
The use of community standards was one of the
strengths of the Stewart plurality's opinions. In
looking to the legislative response to Furman, the
Stewart plurality made a reasonable assumption that
the response would be a fair barometer of current
social standards. Furthermore, the fact that a rela-
tively large number of people have been sentenced to
death under post-Furman statutes in a relatively
short time added to the permissible conclusion that
society has not rejected capital punishment.
The strength of the Stewart plurality was the
weakness of Justice Marshall's opinion. He at-
tempted to base part of his decision against capital
punishment in Furman on the theory that contempo-
120408 U.S. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring), 366
n.155 (Marshall,J., concurring).
12'Id. at 296 (Brennan, J., concurring), 369 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
1221d. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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rary values had rejected death penalties. That argu-
ment has apparently been emasculated in the years
following Furman by the legislative response to Fur-
man and the number of defendants sentenced to
death under new statutes. Justice Marshall acknowl-
edged these developments, yet explained that he in-
tended only to consider the opinion of an informed
citizenry. Such a citizenry would exist when all the
information which was relevant to the issue was
disseminated and understood by the public. It is un-
likely that any such state of affairs will come to pass
soon, if for no other reason than the tremendous
amount and complexity of the relevant data. Given
the general acceptance of capital punishment re-
flected in the legislative response to Furman, the
number of defendants sentenced to death under these
statutes, and the various referendums cited by the
Stewart plurality 123 one would have to agree with
the majority that society has not yet rejected the
ultimate penalty of death.
More must be found in order to uphold capital
punishment against an eighth amendment challenge
however, according to the Stewart plurality. The
second prong of the test is that the penalty must not
be excessive. 14 Both the Stewart and White plurali-
ties' opinions continue to rely on public opinion as an
indicator of what constitutes excessive punishment.
But simply because a community demands the life of
an individual for brtaking the community's law does
not necessarily mean that the penalty is not excessive
or that life should be sacrificed. As Justice Marshall
points out, it is difficult to believe that without
capital punishment, the nation would turn to "self-
help, vigilante justice, and lynch law" as feared by
the plurality. 12'
The White plurality acknowledges that no specific
deterrent factor can be identified involving capital
punishment, yet prefers to accept the legislative
judgment that there is some deterrent effect in the
penalty of death. But while there is much to be said
for not allowing the judiciary to act legislatively, it is
the Court that has the responsibility for determining
in the final analysis whether the penalty is excessive.
The legislatures have already made at least the
implicit determination that the death penalty is not
excessive by their enactment of capital punishment
statutes. If the Court is unwilling to examine those
legislative justifications for capital punishment, then
..
3 Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2929 (1976)
(Stewart, J., plurality).
... d. at 2925.
1251d. at 2976 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
it will have no basis for determining whether the
penalty is excessive.
This refusal to go behind the legislative justifica-
tions will create problems for the Court in deciding
whether capital punishment is excessive for crimes
other than murder, such as armed robbery, rape, or
kidnapping. If the Court follows the analysis set
forth by the Stewart and White pluralities, the fact
that the states have enacted such penalties will be
given great weight in determination of whether the
penalty is excessive. However, the focus of the second
prong of the eighth amendment test should not be
concerned with popular acceptance as much as with
other values, such as whether the penalty does in fact
fit the crime and whether it is an unnecessary
infliction of pain and suffering.
Although the Stewart plurality purports to build
on prior case history, it had to selectively ignore
significant holdings of cases recently decided in order
to arrive at some of its conclusions. One prominent
example is the case of McGautha v. California. 126
Even though the McGautha case is liberally cited
throughout the Stewart plurality's opinions, its
holding is clearly in conflict with the approach taken
by the plurality, since in McGautha the Court held
that it is constitutionally permissible to impose death
without governing standards. 'The Stewart plural-
ity attempted to explain away the problem in a
footnote, stating that McGautha was not an eighth
amendment but a fourteenth amendment case and
that while Furman did not overrule McGautha
it is clearly in substantial tension with a broad reading
of McGautha's holding. In view of Furman, McCau-
tha can be rationally viewed as a precedent only for the
proposition that standardless jury sentencing proce-
dures were not employed in the cases before the Court
so as to violate the Due Process Clause. 128
Another example of this same problem is the
treatment of Spencer v. Texas. "2"Spencer held that a
bifurcated trial is not constitutionally mandated, yet
the Stewart plurality held that the state must provide
a separate procedure under which the sentencing
authority must consider any mitigating circum-
stances along with the character and record of the
defendant. 1"o While this does not have to be done in
128402 U.S. 183 (1971). See the discussion of McGautha
by Justice White in his dissent ift Roberts, 96 S.Ct. at
3013.12'Id. at 183.12
'Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S.Ct. at 2929 (Stewart, J.,
plurality).




a formalized bifurcated trial, the intent of the plu-
rality is that there be a two stage process: guilt find-
ing and sentencing. One can speculate that the same
reasoning applied to distinguish McGautha would
also be used to distinguish Spencer from Gregg and
its companion cases.
SUMMARY
In summary, a majority of the Court squarely
upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment.
There was no majority opinion, but with regard to
the constitutionality of particular statutes one can
look to the Stewart plurality as the narrowest
position upholding death penalty statutes and con-
dude that a statute imposing the death penalty will
be upheld if (1) there are sentencing guides, usually
expressed in terms of aggravating circumstances, to
aid the sentencing authority in making the decision
whether to impose the death penalty and if (2) there
is a separate procedure by which the defendant has
an opportunity to bring any mitigating circumstances
to the attention of the sentencing authority. Because
of the relative clarity and substantial agreement
between the pluralities in these cases, Gregg and its
companion cases should settle for some time the
fundamental questions involving the constitutionality
of capital punishment for the crime of murder.
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